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STEPPING INTO THE “WRONG”
NEIGHBORHOOD: A CRITIQUE OF THE
PEOPLE V. ALBILLAR’S EXPANSION OF
CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE SECTION
186.22(a) AND A CALL TO REEXAMINE THE
TREATMENT OF GANG AFFILIATION
SAMUEL DIPIETRO*
Since 1988, the number of California criminal street gangs has
increased from 600 to 6,442, an increase of roughly 973%. This dramatic
increase in gang participation occurred despite the California Legislature
adopting increasingly harsher anti-gang laws. One such law, adopted in
1988, is the Street Terrorism and Enforcement Prevention Act (STEP Act),
which contains a substantive offense for being a member of a criminal street
gang and an enhancement offense for committing gang-related crimes. In
2010, the California Supreme Court, in the case of People v. Albillar,
interpreted Section 186.22(a) of the STEP Act to apply to any felonious
criminal conduct by gang members instead of solely gang-related felonious
conduct. The court’s holding in Albillar essentially allows a defendant who
is affiliated with a criminal street gang to receive an additional sentence for
the commission of any felonious crime regardless of whether the crime had
any relationship to the defendant’s gang membership. This Comment argues
that such an application of Section 186.22(a) runs afoul of the Supreme
Court’s holding in Robinson v. California, where the Court held that
punishing an addict for his status of being addicted to drugs amounted to
cruel and unusual punishment. While Section 186.22(a) does require a
felonious act unlike the statute in Robinson, this Comment examines the
Supreme Court’s holdings regarding the constitutionality of hate crime
enhancements and concludes that the California Supreme Court’s holding in
* I would like to thank Professor Leonard Rubinowitz, Emelia Carroll, and Reilly Frye for
their guidance and editorial support throughout this Comment’s development process. Also, I
would like to thank my beautiful wife, Cheyenne DiPietro, whose interest in criminal law
inspired me to write about this topic.
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Albillar exceeds constitutional bounds. This Comment concludes by
examining the policy rationale behind the Robinson holding and applying
that rationale to gang membership, suggesting that treatment, as opposed to
imprisonment, might be the proper solution to California’s criminal street
gang problem.
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 625
I. THE STEP ACT & SECTION 186.22 .......................................... 626
A. A Brief History of the STEP Act .................................... 626
B. Section 186.22: A Substantive Crime and a Criminal
Enhancement .................................................................. 628
II. THE PEOPLE v. ALBILLAR AND SECTION 186.22(A)’S
EXPANSION TO INCLUDE NON-GANG-RELATED
CRIMES ................................................................................. 630
A. People v. Albillar: Background, Crimes, and Convictions
........................................................................................ 630
B. Subsequent Appeal and the California Supreme Court
Holding ........................................................................... 631
C. Significance of Holding and Post-Albillar Decisions ..... 634
III. ROBINSON v. CALIFORNIA & POWELL V. TEXAS: WHEN
DOES PUNISHING A STATUS GO TOO FAR? ................ 635
A. The Requirements of Culpability: Actus Reus and Mens
Rea .................................................................................. 635
B. California’s Ban on Drug Addiction and the Supreme
Court in Robinson ........................................................... 636
C. Powell v. Texas: Defining the Limits of the Robinson
Doctrine .......................................................................... 638
D. Contrasting Robinson with Powell: Punishing a Desire as
Contrasted with Punishing an Action. ............................ 641
IV. APPLYING ROBINSON AND POWELL TO SECTION 186.22(a)
............................................................................................... 642
A. As a Substantive Offense, Section 186.22(a) Should Be
Deemed Unconstitutional ............................................... 642
B. If Classified as An Enhancement Offence, Section
186.22(A) Should Be Deemed Unconstitutional ............ 645
V. GANG AFFILIATION SHOULD BE TREATED THROUGH
REHABILITATION RATHER THAN THROUGH
CRIMINALIZATION AND IMPRISONMENT ................... 648
A. Why Punishing Addiction Amounts to a Cruel and Unusual
Punishment ..................................................................... 648
B. The Policy Rationale for Treating Rather than Imprisoning

2020]

STEPPING INTO THE “WRONG” NEIGHBORHOOD

625

Drug Addicts Also Applies to Gang Affiliates ............... 651
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 654
INTRODUCTION
What do we know to be true about gang violence? We know we will fail if we fixate
on the symptoms and not address what undergirds it. 1

Imagine a world where a society has determined that fraternities are
against social policy. However, a Constitution prevents this society from
punishing mere fraternity membership, so the society creates a law that
increases the punishment for active fraternity members who commit crimes
by up to three years. By including an underlying criminal offense, this
society deems that the law does not punish being a member of a fraternity,
but only fraternity members who commit crimes. But this additional
sentence only applies to fraternity members when they commit a crime; if a
non-fraternity member committed the same crime, they would not receive an
additional sentence. Since it is difficult to determine who is a fraternity
member, courts in this world allow fraternity experts to testify as to whether
a defendant is a member of or associated with a fraternity. Furthermore,
prosecutors can present evidence of a defendant’s fraternity association, such
as a defendant’s family history, fraternity membership, the community where
a defendant lives, and even the type of clothes that a defendant wears. In the
context of fraternity membership, such a world might seem absurd. But this
world is very real in the context of gang membership and gang affiliation in
California under the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act
(STEP Act), codified in Section 186.22 of the California Penal Code.
In the past decade, numerous journal articles have critiqued and often
criticized the STEP Act; however, the Act has fallen out of the jurisprudential
spotlight as of late. This is despite several California Supreme Court
decisions that have expanded the applicability of the Act to encompass more
and more criminal activities. In addition, in the past few years, other state
courts have begun to question the constitutionality of their gang enhancement
provisions when examining similar gang enhancement statutes. 2 Therefore,
it is time that the STEP Act is reexamined.

1

Gregory J. Boyle, A Lethal Absence of Hope, L.A. TIMES, (Oct. 15, 2002), http://articl
es.latimes.com/2002/oct/15/opinion/oe-boyle15 [https://perma.cc/S6W4-VE4T].
2
See, e.g., State v. Turner, No. E201600651CCAR3CDE2016-00651-CCA-R3-CD, 2017
WL 1830106 *19 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 5, 2017) (holding Tennessee’s gang enhancement
statute unconstitutional); Rodriguez v. State, 671 S.E.2d 497, 503 (Ga. 2009) (holding
Georgia’s gang enhancement statute constitutional).
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This Comment examines the modern-day STEP Act, discusses the
impact of People v. Albillar’s interpretation of Section 186.22(a) to include
non-gang-related felonies, and argues that Section 186.22(a) has exceeded
Constitutional limits in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Robinson
v. California and Powell v. Texas. This Comment then proceeds to argue
that, as a matter of public policy, gang affiliation—like drug addiction—is
better treated through rehabilitation programs as opposed to imprisonment.
Part I of this Comment summarizes the history of the STEP Act and
introduces Sections 186.22(a) and 186.22(b). Part II introduces and
discusses the importance of People v. Albillar’s expansion of Section
186.22(a) to include non-gang-related felonious offenses. Part III introduces
the foundational requirements of culpability and examines the application of
these requirements in the Supreme Court cases Robinson v. California and
Powell v. Texas. Part IV then applies Robinson and Powell to Section
186.22(a), concluding that Section 186.22(a), post-Albillar, is
unconstitutional. Part V makes a policy related argument that, like drug
addiction, gang affiliation should be treated with rehabilitation rather than
punished with imprisonment.
I. THE STEP ACT & SECTION 186.22
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE STEP ACT

Anti-gang legislation increases the ability of prosecutors to prosecute
gang activities. Examples of anti-gang legislation are statutes that
criminalize gang recruitment and gang solicitation. 3 Anti-gang legislation is
oftentimes justified based on the notion that gangs protect their associates
and, because many gang crimes are committed in groups, it is more difficult
for law enforcement to curb gang crime absent laws that specifically target
gang members. 4 This justification is what led California to become the first
state to adopt anti-gang legislation through the adoption of the STEP Act in
1988. 5
The preamble to the STEP Act (the Act) provides that the Act was
enacted to address the nearly 600 criminal street gangs operating in
California. 6 The Act attempted to curb gang membership by making it a
criminal offense to engage in certain gang activities. 7 Almost immediately
3

Beth Bjerregaard, The Constitutionality of Anti-Gang Legislation, 21 CAMPBELL L. REV.
31, 32 (1998).
4
People v. Albillar, 244 P.3d 1062, 1068 (Cal. 2010).
5
Id.
6
See Cal. Penal Code § 186.21 (West 2012).
7
See Bjerregaard supra note 3, at 32.
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after enactment, the Act was in the public spotlight. 8 Dubbed “Baby RICO,”
enforcement of the Act began with police officers asking suspected gang
members to sign “special-delivery notices” that served to notify suspected
gang members of the new law; these were considered admissible as evidence
of gang membership in court. 9 Enforcement of the Act immediately became
controversial in 1989 when police, relying on the Act, arrested a mother for
allegedly supporting her son’s gang involvement. 10 Specifically, the mother
was arrested for failing to supervise her son and for creating an environment
that encouraged his gang involvement. 11 While the mother’s case was
ultimately dismissed after she successfully completed a parenting program,
such arguably broad applications of the Act led the American Civil Liberties
Union of Southern California (ACLU) to file suit on the grounds that the Act
was unconstitutionally vague. 12 The ACLU’s lawsuit was successful, and
within the first two years of the Act taking effect, the provision of the Act
that was used to prosecute the mother was deemed unconstitutional for failing
8
See Mike Reilly, Law to Check Gang Violence Sparks Debate, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
Oct. 13, 1990, at 13.
9
Michele Fuetsch, New Weapon in Gang Wars: Compton Police Serve Written Notice of
Street Terrorism Act, L.A. TIMES (June 1, 1989), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm1989-06-01-hl-1288-story.html [https://perma.cc/9WHT-SHBW]; see also Mike Ward,
Pasadena Police Plan Crackdown on Gangs: Department Assigns More Officers and Is Ready
to Prosecute Under State Law on Street Terrorists, L.A. TIMES (May 21, 1989), https://
www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-05-21-ga-655-story.html [https://perma.cc/9QHRHEX4] (the notice that police attempted to have suspected gang members sign provided in
part “IRA REINER DISTRICT ATTORNEY . . . IN RE: THE MATTER OF GANG TO:
MEMBERS OF THE GANG AND, YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the GANG is a
criminal street gang engaging in a pattern of criminal street gang activity within the meaning
of Penal Code Section 186.22 . . . .YOU ARE FOR THIS REASON FURTHER NOTIFIED
THAT ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN A CRIMINAL STREET GANG COULD SUBJECT
YOU TO IMPRISONMENT IN THE STATE PRISON FOR A PERIOD OF UP TO THREE
YEARS PURSUANT TO THE STREET TERRORISM ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1988”).
10
See Editorial, Holding Parents Responsible for Teens, CHI TRIBUNE (May 9, 1989),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1989-05-09-8904110259-story.html [https://
perma.cc/D65E-7QA6] (claiming that the first use of the STEP Act to arrest an alleged gang
member’s mother “reflects widespread frustration with teenage crime and drug dealing and is
intended to serve notice to parents that they cannot abandon their responsibilities”); see also
Bruce Buursma, When Mom’s Just One of the Gang, L.A. Gets Tough, CHI. TRIBUNE (May 7,
1989), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1989-05-07-8904100543-story.html
[https://perma.cc/V5D7-SZ9G].
11
See Buursma, supra note 10.
12
Associated Press, Appeals Court Voids ‘Gang Mom’ Law, L.A. TIMES, (Dec. 22, 1991,
12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-12-22-mn-1615-story.html [http
s://perma.cc/RJ65-XB6R]; Paul Lieberman & Elizabeth J. Mann, Anti-Gang Law Hit in ACLU
Suit: Measure That Holds Parents Responsible Called Unfair to Poor, L.A. TIMES, (July 21,
1989), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-07-21-me-4332-story.html [https://pe
rma.cc/7F34-NC6Q].
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to define “reasonable parenting.” 13 Since then various other provisions of
the Act have also been challenged on constitutional grounds. 14 The Act’s
most commonly challenged sections are Section 186.22(a) and 186.22(b).
B. SECTION 186.22: A SUBSTANTIVE CRIME AND A CRIMINAL
ENHANCEMENT

Section 186.22 of the Act contains both a substantive offense and a
sentencing enhancement; Section 186.22(a) criminalizes actively
participating in a criminal street gang and Section 186.22(b) enhances a
sentence for committing crimes that benefit or promote a criminal street
gang. 15 While these sections are distinct in the sense that they can be
prosecuted separately, they can also be prosecuted simultaneously. 16 The
ability to prosecute these offenses simultaneously can dramatically increase
the minimum sentence for most felonies. For example, while a conviction
for witness intimidation in California generally carries a maximum sentence
of three years, the application of Section 186.22 can increase the sentence to
life imprisonment. 17 This is due to any felonious offense committed under
Section 186.22(a) or 186.22(b) counting towards California’s “three-strike”
law which increases the sentences for habitual offenders. Thus, a defendant
could receive two strikes in the same complaint if he is convicted of violating
both Section 186.22(a) and 186.22(b). 18
While subtle, the distinction between a substantive offense and an
enhancement offense is important. A substantive offense is “[a] crime that
is complete in itself and is not dependent on another crime for one of its
elements.” 19 Unlike a substantive offense, an enhancement offense is “[a]n
offense that has a greater degree of severity than the normal offense of the

13

See Associated Press, supra note 12.
See, e.g., In re Alberto R., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding gang
enhancement provision did not violate the Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition on
vagueness); People v. Gamez, 286 Cal. Rptr. 894, 902 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the
gang enhancement provision did not violate defendant’s First Amendment rights).
15
Wes Reber Porter, Threaten Sentencing Enhancement, Coerce Plea, (Wash, Rinse,)
Repeat: A Cause of Wrongful Conviction by Guilty Plea, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 261, 295
(2015).
16
See generally People v. Albillar, 244 P.3d 1062, 1064 (Cal. 2010) (affirming both the
substantive offense under Section 186.22(a) and the enhancement offense under Section
186.22(b)).
17
See Martin Baker, Stuck in the Thicket: Struggling with Interpretation and Application
of California’s Anti-Gang STEP Act, 11 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 101, 105 (2006).
18
Id.
19
See Offense, Crime, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
14
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same kind, [] because of aggravating circumstances.” 20 An illustrative
example, not related to the Act, would be robbing a store with a weapon.
Robbing a store would be a substantive offense in and of itself, whereas the
use of a weapon to rob a store would be an enhancement offense; it carries a
greater degree of severity than just robbing a store but cannot exist
independently from robbing the store.
Despite the distinction between an enhancement and substantive
offense, both offenses require the prosecutor charging a defendant under the
Act to prove the existence of a criminal street gang. Section 186.22(f) defines
a criminal street gang as “any ongoing organization . . . of three or more
persons . . . having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or
more of the criminal acts enumerated [in Subsection (e)].” 21 Subsection
186.22(e) provides a laundry list of criminal activities that qualify as gang
activities including: assault, unlawful possession of a firearm, sale and
manufacture of controlled substances, fraud, theft, rape, and vandalism. 22
The substantive offense requires that the prosecutor prove the following
elements: the defendant was an active participant in a criminal street gang,
the defendant knew that the gang’s members engage in a pattern of criminal
activity, and the defendant willfully assisted in any “felonious criminal
conduct by [gang] members.” 23 Common proof of active participation in a
street gang is: the existence of gang tattoos or gang paraphernalia, admission
by the defendant to being an active participant in a criminal street gang,
presence with known gang members at the time of arrest, witness testimony
establishing the defendant’s affiliation with a gang, and circumstantial
evidence indicating active participation, such as close association between
the defendant and gang members. 24 However, since there is not a widely
accepted definition for what being a “gang member” is, there is not a
requirement that a defendant actually be a member of the gang. Instead,
affiliation with a gang, as evidenced by the aforementioned common proof
of active participation, is deemed adequate to show active participation in a
gang. In addition to the above, the enhancement offense requires that the
prosecutor prove the defendant committed a felony for the benefit of a
criminal street gang and with the intent to further the gang’s criminal

20

Id.
Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely Transitioning Every Person
(FIRST STEP) Act, 18 U.S.C. § 186.22(f) (2018).
22
Id. at § 186.22(e).
23
People v. Lamas, 169 P.3d 102, 106 (Cal. 2007).
24
J. Franklin Sigal, Out of Step: When the California Street Terrorism Enforcement and
Prevention Act Stumbles into Penal Code Limits, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1, 32 (2007).
21
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conduct. 25 Prosecutors often prove intent to further the gang’s criminal
conduct by using an expert witness, which is someone with general
knowledge of criminal street gangs based on training, education, or
experience, and who can thus provide the jury with testimony in regards to
whether the defendant is a member of a criminal street gang. 26
Section II and Section IV of this Comment will focus on the “any
felonious criminal conduct by [gang] members” element in Section
186.22(a). Originally, “any felonious criminal conduct” was interpreted to
mean felonious conduct that was gang-related. 27 The significance of this was
that in order for the defendant to be criminally liable, the prosecutor would
have to prove that the defendant was “an aider and abettor to any specific
crime committed by a member or members of a criminal street gang.”28
Thus, if a gang member committed a felony unrelated to his or her gang
membership, Section 186.22(a) would be inapplicable when prosecuting the
gang member for the felonious crime. But in 2010, People v. Albillar, as
discussed in the next section, extended the application of Section 186.22(a)
to felonious crimes committed by gang members that were unrelated to their
gang membership.
II. THE PEOPLE V. ALBILLAR AND SECTION 186.22(A)’S
EXPANSION TO INCLUDE NON-GANG-RELATED CRIMES
A. PEOPLE V. ALBILLAR: BACKGROUND, CRIMES, AND
CONVICTIONS

In December 2004, John Madrigal, Albert Albillar and Alex Albillar
raped fifteen-year-old Amanda M. 29 In addition to numerous sex offenses,
all three were charged with violating Section 186.22(a) and Section

25

§ 186.22(b).
People v. Blessett, 232 Cal. Rptr. 3d 164, 198 (Ct. App. 2018) as modified on denial of
reh’g (May 24, 2018). The Author would like to note that an Editor, when reviewing this
Article, made the excellent observation that California Rule 720 requires an expert witness to
have “special knowledge” as opposed to merely “general knowledge.” Without going into too
much depth, California courts have allowed expert testimony concerning an expert’s “general
knowledge;” for an excellent analysis of what an expert can and cannot testify to see People
v. Sanchez, 63 Cal. 4th 665, 676 (2016) (“[K]nowledge in a specialized area is what
differentiates the expert from a lay witness . . . [a]s such, an expert’s testimony concerning his
general knowledge, even if technically hearsay, has not been subject to exclusion on hearsay
grounds.”).
27
People v. Ngoun, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837, 839 (Cal. 2001).
28
People v. Green, 278 Cal. Rptr. 140, 148 (Ct. App. 1991).
29
People v. Albillar, 244 P.3d 1062, 1065 (Cal. 2010).
26
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186.22(b). 30 While all three admitted to being members of the Southside
Chiques street gang, a gang known for committing a wide assortment of
crimes in the Oxnard, California area, they claimed that the rape was not
gang-related because they did not commit the rape on behalf of, or to the
benefit of, the Southside Chiques gang. 31
At trial, Oxnard Police Detective Neail Holland testified as an expert
witness. 32 Holland testified that members of the Southside Chiques gang
obtain status in the gang through the commission of crimes.33 Holland
further testified that the defendants’ actions were likely for the benefit of the
Southside Chiques gang because the viciousness of the crime would increase
the gang’s notorious reputation. 34 But Holland also acknowledged that
Hispanic gangs, like the Southside Chiques, punish rape, and “[i]f a gang
member were convicted of rape, he would ‘lose status within the gang.’” 35
Weighing Holland’s somewhat conflicting testimony, the jury convicted the
three defendants of violating Section 186.22(a) and Section 186.22(b) along
with numerous other sex crimes. 36
B. SUBSEQUENT APPEAL AND THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
HOLDING

As previously discussed, prior to People v. Albillar, it was commonly
understood that Section 186.22(a) was only applicable to gang-related
conduct. 37 Based on this understanding, the defendants appealed the Section
186.22(a) conviction on the grounds that Section 186.22(a) includes an
“implied requirement that the felonious criminal conduct be gang related”
and, as evidenced by Holland’s testimony, the Southside Chiques gang
opposed rape. 38 Reviewing the defendants’ appeal, the California Supreme
Court began by examining the plain language of Section 186.22(a). The
court noted that the text of Section 186.22(a) states any felonious conduct
rather than just gang-related felonious conduct and thus, by the statute’s
plain language, it “targets felonious criminal conduct, not [solely] felonious

30

Id. at 1064.
Id. at 1066.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 1067.
35
People v. Albillar, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 383, 390 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), review granted and
opinion superseded, 190 P.3d 534 (Cal. 2008), and aff’d, 244 P.3d 1062 (2010).
36
Albillar, 244 P.3d at 1065.
37
See People v. Ngoun, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837 (2001).
38
Albillar, 244 P.3d at 1067.
31
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gang-related conduct.” 39 The court justified its interpretation by explaining
that crimes committed by gang members in conjunction with one another
pose dangers to the public not present in crimes committed by persons with
no gang affiliations. 40 For example, witnesses might be less likely to testify
against a gang member knowing that they might face retaliation from the
gang.
The court noted that the gravamen of Section 186.22(a) is the active
participation requirement rather than whether the underlying crime is gangrelated. 41 The defendants challenged this interpretation as a violation of
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), which held in part that criminal
liability cannot be based on mere membership. 42 The California Supreme
Court rejected this challenge by distinguishing Scales from the present case.
The court held that while Scales barred guilt based solely on membership,
Scales did not bar guilt based on active membership—membership that is
more than nominal or passive. 43
The court, relying on its prior decision in the People v. Castenada, 3
P.3d 278 (Cal. 2000), held that the active participation requirement of Section
186.22(a) allows the statute to withstand the Scales requirements. 44 The
defendants called attention to the Castenada court’s dicta that “section
186.22(a) would pass constitutional muster only if it were to link a
defendant’s criminal liability to a separate felony offense committed by street
39

Id. at 1068.
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.; see Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 227 (1961) (discussing that “membership,
even when accompanied by the elements of knowledge and specific intent, affords an
insufficient quantum of participation in the organization’s alleged criminal activity, that is, an
insufficiently significant form of aid and encouragement to permit the imposition of criminal
sanctions on that basis”).
43
Albillar, 244 P. 3d at 1069. (“The high court [United States Supreme Court] construed
the statute to require active membership and, as so construed, upheld it despite the absence of
any element requiring a specific act of criminality, placing active membership in the same
category as criminal conspiracy and complicity—” particular legal concepts manifesting the
more general principle that society, having the power to punish dangerous behavior, cannot
be powerless against those who work to bring about that behavior.”) (internal citations
omitted); see also infra Section I.B (discussing the evidence commonly used to show active
participation. Since the question of whether the defendant was an “active participant” is a
question of fact there is not a “bright line” definition, rather the trier of fact must weigh the
evidence and determine whether they believe the defendant to be an active participant in the
gang.).
44
Albillar, 244 P. 3d at 1070; see also People v. Castenada, 3 P.3d 278 (Cal. 2000)
(holding that the “actively participates” requirement of Section 186.22(a) was not
unconstitutionally vague and that the distinction between active and nominal participation was
well understood in common parlance).
40
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gang members in furtherance of the gang.” 45 The Castenada court’s rationale
was that the underlying felonious criminal conduct must be related to the
defendant’s gang membership in order to prove active participation as
opposed to participation that was merely nominal or passive. 46 The
Castenada court’s concern was that, absent a gang-related underlying felony,
Section 186.22(a) would punish mere gang association and thus render the
statute unconstitutional. 47
The Albillar court responded that in Castenada, they were not asked to
address whether the underlying offense must be gang-related; therefore, the
defendants’ reliance on Castenada was misplaced. 48 The court examined the
legislative history of Section 186.22(a) and noted that the original bill read,
“[a]ny person who actively conducts or participates, directly or indirectly, in
any gang, with the specific intent to promote or further any of its criminal
gang-related activity or to assist in continuing its pattern of criminal gangrelated activity.” 49 Since the amended bill omitted the italicized portions of
the proposed bill, the court concluded that the legislature intended Section
186.22(a) to apply to any felonious conduct. 50
The court further justified this interpretation of the statute by noting that
gang members tend to protect each other regardless of whether the conduct
was gang-related, and thus, gang membership poses unique “dangers to the
public and difficulties for law enforcement not generally present when a
crime is committed by someone with no gang affiliation.” 51 Addressing the
Castenada court’s concern that applying Section 186.22(a) to non-gangrelated crimes might lead to the punishment of passive membership, the
Albillar court held that proof of active participation, including guilty
knowledge, would be enough to prevent Section 186.22(a) from penalizing
the nominal or passive gang member.52 Having considered the argument, the
court concluded that felonious conduct in Section 186.22(a) applies to all
felonious conduct regardless of whether it is gang -related. 53

45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

See Albillar, 244 P. 3d at 1070.
See Castenada, 3 P.3d at 285.
Id.
Albillar, 244 P. 3d at 1068.
Id. at 1068.
Id. at 1068–69.
Id. at 1068.
Id. at 1067–68.
Id. at 1068–69.
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C. SIGNIFICANCE OF HOLDING AND POST-ALBILLAR DECISIONS

The Albillar holding amounts to a significant departure from other
states’ interpretation of their gang affiliation statutes to require that the
underlying crime be gang-related. 54 States that require a nexus between gang
membership and the underlying felonious crime have concluded that absent
a nexus, a gang enhancement would inherently punish mere gang
membership. 55 Deviating from this interpretation, post-Albillar California
cases have subjected California defendants to substantive gang sentences for
crimes such as carjacking, robbery, drug possession, and felony possession
of a firearm even when the crimes had no benefit to a criminal street gang.56
In 2012, the California Supreme Court, seemingly attempting to narrow the
scope of Section 186.22(a) post-Albillar, held that while Section 186.22(a)
can apply to non-gang-related felonious conduct, the felonious conduct must
be committed by two or more persons. 57 Logically, this requirement would
seem to suggest that there exists a link between the underlying felonious
conduct and the gang in the sense that two or more gang affiliates acting in
concert to commit a crime would seem inherently gang -related. But the
court specifically reiterated that the underlying crime need not be gangrelated. 58 Furthermore, as shown in Section IV, this requirement can easily
be manipulated, and the issue of the substantive gang offense applying to
non-gang-related conduct still remains. 59 The next sections will introduce
Robinson v. California and Powell v. Texas, two Supreme Court cases that
discuss the punishment of status, and will serve as the baseline to determine
whether Section 186.22 is constitutional.

54

See State v. Turner, No. E2016-00651-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1830106 at *19 (Tenn.
Crim. App. May 5, 2017) (“[T]he statutory provision offends the principle of due process
because it fails to tie membership in a gang to the offense at issue.”); see also Rushing v.
Virginia, 726 S.E.2d 333, 338 (Va. 2012) (“A defendant charged with gang
participation . . . may be convicted upon a showing that he participated in a gang-related
crime.”); State v. State v. Caldwell, 815 N.W.2d 512, 517 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012) (“The state
here had to prove that Caldwell shot P.B. intending to benefit the Crips . . . .”).
55
See Turner, 2017 WL 1830106, at *17.
56
See, e.g., Ruiz v. Gipson, No. 1:14-cv-00224-LJO-JLT (HC),114CV00224LJOJLTHC,
2017 WL 1064650, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2017); Corcoles v. Lewis, No. SACV 11-0648JSL (RNB), 2013 WL 1401369, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2013).
57
See People v. Rodriguez, 290 P.3d 1143, 1153 (Cal. 2012).
58
Id.
59
See People v. Lopez, No. A133997, 2013 WL 4784760, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 9,
2013) (affirming defendant’s Section 186.22(a) conviction for unlawful firearm possession at
a home where he had lived with his sister who was also associated with the gang. The section
186.22(b) was also affirmed because possessing a gun was deemed to benefit a street gang.).
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III. ROBINSON V. CALIFORNIA & POWELL V. TEXAS: WHEN DOES
PUNISHING A STATUS GO TOO FAR?
A. THE REQUIREMENTS OF CULPABILITY: ACTUS REUS AND
MENS REA

Prior to discussing Robinson v. California and Powell v. Texas, it is
worthwhile to provide a brief background on the requirements of culpability
underlying the Robinson Court’s decision. Two Latin terms to which firstyear law students quickly become accustomed in their criminal law course
are “mens rea” and “actus reus.” Actus reus requires that liability be attached
to a certain action, and mens rea refers to the culpable state of mind that must
accompany the action for a criminal sentence to be imposed. 60 Taken
together, both terms establish the bedrock for imposing criminal liability.
To better illustrate the concepts of actus reus and mens rea, consider the
following example. A defendant is charged with vandalism due to crashing
through a store window. The actus reus would be crashing through the store
window and the mens rea would be the defendant’s intent to crash through
the window or his negligence in doing so. But had the defendant been hit by
a car that propelled him into the window, then there would be no actus reus
on the part of the defendant because there was not a volitional act by the
defendant. Likewise, mens rea would be absent in the case where the
defendant was hit by a car because the defendant had no intent to be propelled
into the window and the defendant’s negligent actions did not cause the crash.
In both cases, the defendant crashed through the window, but in the second
case, where the defendant was hit by a car, the defendant would not be liable
due to the absence of mens rea and actus reus.
The imposition of both an actus reus and a mens rea requirement aligns
with the higher purposes of criminal law: to deter, to punish, and to
rehabilitate. The purpose of deterrence is to impose a punishment that will
both prevent the guilty person from committing the offense in the future and
prevent others in the community from committing the offense. 61 For
example—returning to the defendant hit by a car causing the crash through
the window—the law would not punish the defendant because doing so
would have no deterrent effect; it was not the defendant’s fault that the crash
occurred. The retributive purpose of criminal law has the goal of punishing
offenders to make them realize the moral depravity of their actions.62
60

See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.01, 2.02 (1962).
John E. Witte, Jr. & Thomas C. Arthur, The Three Uses of the Law: A Protestant Source
of the Purposes of Criminal Punishment?, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 433, 452 (1993).
62
Id. at 455.
61
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Likewise, the defendant who is struck by a car causing the defendant to crash
through the window did not commit a morally reprehensible action and thus
punishment would not serve a retributive effect.
The final purpose of criminal law is rehabilitative. Rehabilitation has
the goal of integrating an offender back into society and restoring the rule of
law to the community.63 In the case of a defendant who purposefully crashed
into a store window and was not hit by another car, the rehabilitative goal
would be to integrate the defendant back into society so that the defendant
does not break more windows in the future. Whereas in the case where the
defendant was hit by a car, there would be no rehabilitative effect because it
is unlikely that the defendant could control being hit by a car in the future.
The distinction between what is appropriate to punish and what is not
appropriate to punish underlies the Supreme Court’s decisions in Robinson
v. California and Powell v. Texas.
B. CALIFORNIA’S BAN ON DRUG ADDICTION AND THE SUPREME
COURT IN ROBINSON

In the 1962 case, Robinson v. California, the United States Supreme
Court examined a California law that subjected drug addicts to criminal
prosecution for their status drug addicts. The law provided that “[n]o person
shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the use of narcotics”
and imposed a sentence from ninety days to a year if convicted. 64 Under this
statute, Lawrence Robinson was arrested when an officer noticed what he
suspected to be needle marks on Robinson’s arm. 65 After being convicted of
being a drug addict, Robinson appealed on the grounds that the statute
violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 66, and the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 67 Justice Stewart, writing for the
majority, concluded that the law violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on
cruel and unusual punishment. 68

63

Id. at 456.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 661–62 n.1 (1962).
65
Id. at 661.
66
See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 11, 29, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)
(No. 554). The Eighth Amendment bars the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments. See,
e.g., Richard Visek, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 875 (1986) (providing more
insight into what constitutes a “cruel and unusual” punishment); see also infra Section V.A.
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees due process and provides that “[n]o state shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 2.
67
See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 66, at 11; Robinson, 370 U.S. at 661.
68
Id. at 667.
64
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The Court first held that the California drug addiction statute lacked an
actus reus requirement because, instead of punishing a defendant for an
action related to drug use, the statute punished a defendant for the “status of
narcotic addiction.” 69 The Court noted that the statute created an offense by
which the defendant would be continually guilty regardless of whether he or
she had actually possessed or used drugs in the State of California. 70 The
notion of continuous guilt was embedded in the common proof submitted to
sustain a conviction of drug addiction: red eyes, pupil size, scars, and a
history of narcotics use. 71 In fact, the defendant in Robinson was convicted
primarily based on the discolorations and scabs on his arms and the testimony
of two officers familiar with the signs of drug addiction. 72 Justice Stewart,
writing for the majority, held that this statute was unconstitutional because it
“[made] the ‘status’ of narcotic addiction a criminal offense, for which the
offender may be prosecuted ‘at any time before he reforms.’” 73 Justice
Harlan, concurring, further noted that punishment for the bare desire to
commit a criminal act is unconstitutional because a defendant cannot control
his or her bare desires. 74
In addition to finding the lack of an actus reus, the Robinson Court
struck down the California addiction statute for punishing a disease. 75 The
notion that punishing a disease is unconstitutional would seem to lend itself
to the concept of mens rea because punishing a disease does not punish a
guilty intention—no one intends to be an addict. This argument is evidenced
in Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion. Justice Douglas began with a
discussion of the development of society’s treatment of the mentally ill, from
punishment to rehabilitative. 76 He attributed this transition to the recognition
of insanity as a disease and the fact that punishing the insane would not serve
to deter the insane from committing crimes because the insane cannot change
the fact that they are insane—insanity is not purposeful. 77 Justice Douglas
69

Id. at 666; see also supra Section III.A (discussing the concept of actus reus).
Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666.
71
See Edwin C. Conrad, The Admissibility of the Nalline Test as Evidence of the Presence
of Narcotics, 50 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 187, 188 (1959).
72
Robinson, 370 U.S at 661–63.
73
Id. at 666.
74
Id. at 678.
75
Id. at 667.
76
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 668–69 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
77
See id. at 668 (“Nothing can more strongly illustrate the popular ignorance respecting
insanity than the proposition, equally objectionable in its humanity and its logic, that the
insane should be punished for criminal acts, in order to deter other insane persons from doing
the same thing.” (quoting TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 56 (5th ed.
70

638

DIPIETRO

[Vol. 110

extended this argument to a drug addict, who, through taking drugs, becomes
dependent upon them and cannot control being an addicted to them. 78 Justice
Douglas noted that convicting an addict was not cruel and unusual
punishment, but rather that convicting an addict of a crime which serves not
to cure but to penalize was cruel and unusual punishment. 79
Analogizing to the breaking the window illustration in Section III.A,
convicting a drug addict for being addicted to drugs is akin to convicting
someone for being hit by a car and breaking a window. A drug addict cannot
control his or her bare desires just as a person cannot control if they break a
window after being hit by a car on the sidewalk. In both cases, punishment
would lack a rehabilitative or a deterrent effect because both the actus reus
and the mens rea would be outside of the defendant’s control. Thus,
Robinson set two precedents, the foremost being that it is unconstitutional to
punish a status and the second being that convicting an addict for his or her
illness amounts to cruel and unusual punishment.
C. POWELL V. TEXAS: DEFINING THE LIMITS OF THE ROBINSON
DOCTRINE

Four years after the Court’s decision in Robinson, the Supreme Court
was asked to decide whether to extend the Robinson doctrine to public
intoxication and alcoholism. Leroy Powell was convicted in the State of
Texas for being intoxicated in public. The law that Powell violated provided
that “[w]hoever shall get drunk or be found in a state of intoxication in any
public place, or at any private house except his own, shall be fined not
exceeding one hundred dollars.” 80 On appeal to the Supreme Court, Powell
argued that his conviction should be overturned due to Robinson’s
prohibition of punishing a status because, like drug addiction, alcoholism is
a disease. 81
Addressing the question of whether the Texas law punished a status, the
Court held that the law did not prohibit the defendant from being an

1871))). Id. The Author notes that the modern-day trend is to classify individuals as suffering
from “mental illness” as opposed to labeling them as “insane.” The Author has chosen to retain
the use of the word “insane” to preserve authenticity of the language used by Justice Douglas.
78
See id. at 673 (“But we do know that there is ‘a hard core’ of ‘chronic and incurable
drug addicts who, in reality, have lost their power of self-control.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 842033, at 8 (1956)).
79
Id. at 676.
80
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 517 (1968) (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 477 (West
1954)).
81
Id. at 521.
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alcoholic, but rather punished the defendant’s behavior in public. The
majority noted:
The State of Texas thus has not sought to punish a mere status, as California did in
Robinson; nor has it attempted to regulate appellant’s behavior in the privacy of his
own home. Rather, it has imposed upon appellant a criminal sanction for public
behavior which may create substantial health and safety hazards, both for appellant and
for members of the general public, and which offends the moral and esthetic
sensibilities of a large segment of the community. 82

The Court clarified that Robinson did not stand for the proposition that
a person cannot be convicted for a status, but rather for the proposition that
to punish a status requires a criminal act, an actus reus. 83 Justice White
clarified what the Court meant by this in his concurring opinion. Powell was
not convicted for being an alcoholic, but rather for being inebriated in a
public place. While subtle, this distinction is vital to reconcile Robinson with
Powell. In Robinson, the Court examined addiction, which was “remote in
time from the application of the criminal sanctions contemplated . . . [and]
relatively permanent in duration.” 84 Public intoxication, unlike addiction, “is
not far removed in time from the acts of ‘getting’ drunk and ‘going’ into
public, and it is not necessarily a state of any great duration.” 85 Thus Justice
White explained that the question to ask when determining whether a law
targets a status, as defined by Robinson, is “whether volitional acts brought
about the ‘condition’ and whether those acts are sufficiently proximate to the
‘condition’ for it to be permissible to impose penal sanctions on the
‘condition.’” 86
Powell, in addition to alleging that the Texas law punished a status,
argued that alcoholism should be considered a disease much like drug
addiction in Robinson. 87 Powell’s support for this argument was mainly
testimony by Dr. David Wade, who testified that Powell was a chronic
alcoholic who, by the time he reached intoxication, would be unable to
control his actions due to his compulsion to drink. 88 However, Dr. Wade also
admitted that there was no consensus in the medical community as to whether
alcoholism was a disease or even a consensus on the definition of

82

Id. at 532.
Id. at 533.
84
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 550 n.2 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 517 (“[Powell’s] counsel urged that [Powell] was ‘afflicted with the disease of
chronic alcoholism’ . . . .”).
88
Id. at 517–18.
83
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alcoholism. 89 On cross-examination, Powell testified that on the day of the
trial, he had one drink, and when asked why he had only one drink, Powell
responded that he exercised willpower. 90 With this being said, on redirect
examination, Powell admitted that he only had enough money for one drink,
suggesting that Powell’s willpower might not have been what ultimately
deterred him from the second drink. 91
As previously discussed, the Court distinguished the present case from
Robinson on the basis that Powell was convicted for an action as opposed to
being convicted due to his status of being an alcoholic. But the Court did
discuss whether it would be appropriate to classify alcoholism as a disease
and the appropriateness of prison sentences for crimes committed by
alcoholics while drunk. Focusing on whether alcoholism is a disease, the
Court discussed the lack of consensus in the medical community as to
whether alcoholism could properly be classified as a disease and the fact that
alcoholics can manifest inconsistent symptoms.92 In Powell’s case, the Court
noted that his first drink was a voluntary exercise of his willpower and that
Powell did not claim to suffer physical symptoms of withdrawal when
deprived of alcohol. 93 This led the Court to determine that it is inconclusive
whether alcoholism can properly be classified as a disease.94
Next, the Court discussed the appropriateness of the criminal process as
applied to alcoholics. The Court noted that there did not exist a widely
accepted rehabilitation method for treating alcoholics, and thus civil
commitment, as suggested in Robinson for drug addicts, was impractical. 95
The Court also clarified that nothing in the Constitution requires that
incarceration have a rehabilitative effect. 96 Furthermore, Justice Black noted
in his concurrence that prison might serve a deterrent effect because the threat
89
See id. (“Dr. Wade sketched the outlines of the ‘disease’ concept of alcoholism; noted
that there is no generally accepted definition of ‘alcoholism’; alluded to the ongoing debate
within the medical profession over whether alcohol is actually physically ‘addicting’ or merely
psychologically ‘habituating’; and concluded that in either case a ‘chronic alcoholic’ is an
‘involuntary drinker,’ who is ‘powerless not to drink,’ and who ‘loses his self-control over his
drinking.”)
90
Id. at 519.
91
Id. at 520.
92
Id. at 522–23.
93
Id. at 526 (“It is one thing to say that if a man is deprived of alcohol his hands will begin
to shake, he will suffer agonizing pains and ultimately he will have hallucinations; it is quite
another to say that a man has a ‘compulsion’ to take a drink, but that he also retains a certain
amount of ‘free will’ with which to resist.”).
94
Id. (noting that psychiatry is undeveloped, the definition of compulsion is inconsistent,
and importing science and medicine into the law is difficult).
95
Id. at 529–30.
96
Id. at 530.
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of incarceration keeps alcoholics from drinking excessively in public. 97 The
Court pointed to the high percentage of alcoholics who conceal their drinking
problems by not engaging in public drunkenness as potential evidence of this
deterrence effect. 98 In addition, the Court noted that imprisoning an alcoholic
gives him or her time to sober up and also takes him or her off of the street,
which increases the overall safety of the public. 99 Based on this analysis, the
Court was unwilling to declare alcoholism a disease. Thus, the holding of
the Powell Court was that when a status is sufficiently proximate to a criminal
act, Robinson does not preclude liability.
D. CONTRASTING ROBINSON WITH POWELL: PUNISHING A DESIRE
AS CONTRASTED WITH PUNISHING AN ACTION.

Contrasting the Robinson court’s holding with the Court’s holding in
Powell provides a standard by which to evaluate Section 186.22(a). As
previously discussed, the Court struck down the California addiction statute
because it punished a continual status—a compulsion—as opposed to the
defendant’s actions. Essentially, the defendant in Robinson did not commit
a crime in addition to his status as a drug addict, whereas the conviction of
the alcoholic in Powell was upheld because his status of being an alcoholic
was linked to the crime of public intoxication. Therefore, in order for a
defendant to be criminally liable, the status itself must not be the underlying
crime, but rather the defendant’s actions must give rise to culpability.
A practical illustration of the distinction between a culpable action and
liability based on a status is the California Appellate Court case People v.
Zapata, which was decided immediately after the Supreme Court’s holding
in Robinson. In Zapata, the defendant was charged with the unlawful
possession of heroin. 100 Zapata contested the trial court’s guilty verdict on
the grounds that it violated Robinson because he possessed the heroin due to
being a drug addict. 101 The Court, upholding the sentence, distinguished the
present case from Robinson on the grounds that Robinson focused on a status,
whereas the present case focused on an antisocial act, Zapata’s possession of
the heroin. 102 Likewise, in Powell, had the Texas law imposed culpability
for Powell’s mere desire to drink, unrelated to Powell being drunk in public,
it would have run afoul of Robinson. But instead of punishing a desire, the
law in Powell punished the antisocial act of being intoxicated while in public.
97

Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 539 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
Id. at 530–31.
99
Id. at 538.
100
People v. Zapata, 34 Cal. Rptr. 171, 173 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
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Id.
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For example, had Zapata received an additional punishment for being an
addict, as opposed to just being punished for his possession of heroin, the
Robinson analysis would be applicable. Because Zapata was only punished
for his possession of heroin, the Powell doctrine applied instead of Robinson.
When applied to Section 186.22(a), the distinction between Robinson and
Powell points to Section 186.22(a) punishing a status as opposed to an
antisocial action.
IV. APPLYING ROBINSON AND POWELL TO SECTION 186.22(A)
A. AS A SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE, SECTION 186.22(A) SHOULD BE
DEEMED UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Disregarding the fact that Section 182.22(a) requires an underlying
felonious offense, penalizing a person for the status of being a gang affiliate
undoubtedly runs afoul of Robinson. When examining the California
addiction statute, the Robinson Court found that the law creating a continuous
offense lacked the “actus reus” element required for culpability.103 Likewise,
Section 186.22(a) also creates a continuous offense absent a clear actus reus.
The California Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that Section
186.22(a) does not criminalize gang membership but rather “active
participation.” 104 The basis for this rationale is that the active participation
and knowledge of a gang’s criminal activity distinguishes Section 186.22(a)
from a status offense, such as in Robinson. 105 But the evidentiary
requirements to prove the active participation and the requisite knowledge of
the gang’s criminal activity amount to proving merely that the defendant was
associated with a gang.
All that the prosecutor needs to show in order to prove active
participation is that the defendant’s participation was more than nominal or
passive. 106 In essence, the actus reus of a Section 186.22(a) offense is being
an active member in a criminal street gang. However, the California
103

Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 660 (1962).
See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 290 P.3d 1143, 1149 (Cal. 2012) (“The Legislature thus
sought to avoid punishing mere gang membership . . . ”); People v. Albillar, 244 P.3d 1062,
1069–70 (Cal. 2010) (“[T]he Legislature expressly required in section 186.22(a) that a
defendant not only ‘actively participates’ in a criminal street gang . . . but also that the
defendant does so with ‘knowledge that [the gang’s] members engage in or have engaged in a
pattern of criminal gang activity,’ and that the defendant ‘willfully promotes, furthers, or
assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang.’ These statutory elements
necessary to prove a violation of section 186.22(a) exceed the due process requirement of
personal guilt.”) (citations omitted).
105
See generally Albillar, 244 P.3d at 1069–70.
106
People v. Castenada, 3 P.3d 278, 280 (Cal. 2000).
104
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Supreme Court has not defined what nominal or passive means. 107 In the
absence of a clear definition, common evidence used by prosecutors to prove
active participation includes the existence of gang tattoos, close association
with known gang members, and testimony establishing that the defendant is
in, or is associated, with a gang. 108 Allowing close association with gang
members to constitute conclusive evidence for active participation would
seem to be the definition of criminalizing gang membership. It seems
necessary that gang members, even passive members, would be somewhat
affiliated with other gang members considering that most gangs are part of a
local community. Furthermore, relying on tattoos as evidence of active gang
membership baselessly presupposes that a passive member would not get a
tattoo and that a formally active member would have the tattoo removed.
The current standard of proving gang affiliation is extremely
problematic.
Absent the underlying crime being gang-related, the
prosecution asks the jury to essentially see whether a shape fits into a hole—
to apply their stereotype of what an active gang member is to the defendant
being tried. Unsurprisingly, convictions based on this type of evidence result
in a disproportionate number of young minority, urban males being convicted
of active participation in a criminal street gang. 109 In addition, like the drug
addiction law in Robinson, it is impossible to tell whether a gang member is
an active member, a passive member, or even a former member based on
evidence common to anyone affiliated with a gang. The only concrete way
to know if a defendant is currently an active gang member or an affiliate is
for the individual to commit a gang-related crime.
Furthermore, the requirement that the defendant has knowledge of the
gang’s criminal activities is insufficient without a corresponding requirement
that the underlying crime be gang-related, which would serve to prove the
defendant’s specific intent to further those activities. The Albillar court
relied on Scales to uphold Section 186.22(a), noting that the defendants had
both knowledge of the gang’s criminal activities and specific intent to
commit a crime. But the Scales opinion states that the member who “lacks
the requisite specific intent to bring about the overthrow of the
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See Baker, supra note 17, at 108–12.
Placido G. Gomez, It Is Not So Simply because an Expert Says It Is So: The Reliability
of Gang Expert Testimony Regarding Membership in Criminal Street Gangs: Pushing the
Limits of Texas Rule of Evidence, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 581, 610 (2003).
109
Sara Lynn Van Hofwegen, Unjust and Ineffective: A Critical Look at California’s
STEP Act, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 679, 683 (2009) (noting that “[i]n the Los Angeles
County gang database, approximately half of all African American men between the ages of
sixteen and twenty-four in Los Angeles County are listed as gang members or associates”).
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government . . . . [is] not by this statute made a criminal.” 110 Thus, Scales
does not support the Albillar court’s assertion that the intent to commit any
crime satisfies the specific intent requirement. Rather, Scales affirms that the
specific intent must be tied to the criminal act; the underlying crime must be
gang-related. Likewise, the only way to determine whether a defendant has
the specific intent to further a gang’s crimes is for the defendant to commit
or assist in a gang-related crime.
Consider the following illustrative case. On April 22, 2010, police
conducted a search of parolee Mario Antonio Lopez’s apartment. 111 Inside a
dresser, the police found an unloaded handgun. 112 Lopez was charged with
unlawful possession of a firearm and active participation in a criminal street
gang pursuant to Section 186.22(a). 113 At trial, Detective Brian Sinigiani
testified as an expert witness that Lopez had tattoos consistent with gang
membership, that Lopez’s family was known for having gang affiliations,
that Lopez possessed letters addressed to gang members, and that a firearm
would be a benefit to a gang because firearms are often used to commit gang
crimes. 114 Lopez was convicted on both counts and sentenced to a term of
nine years. 115 On appeal, the Section 186.22(a) conviction was sustained on
the basis that Sinigiani’s testimony was sufficient for a jury to conclude that
Lopez was actively involved in a street gang and that possessing the firearm
was a felony, thus satisfying the elements of Section 186.22(a). 116
This case illustrates the inherent problems of Section 186.22(a) as
applied to non-gang-related crimes. The jury was asked to make a
determination as to whether Lopez was an active participant in a criminal
street gang not based on any action by Lopez, but based solely on the
testimony of a police detective. 117 Like in Robinson, where two officers
testified against the defendant as to whether he was a drug addict, it is
unsurprising that a jury would rule against the defense when the defendant
was a convicted felon. Such an application of Section 186.22(a) creates a
continuous crime for which a person may be prosecuted at any instance
without the ability to reform. Like someone accused of being a drug addict,
a person accused of violating Section 186.22(a) is criminalized based on
110

Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229–30 (1961) (internal quotations omitted).
People v. Lopez, No. A133997, 2013 WL 4784760, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2013).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at *3.
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Id. at *1.
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Id. at *5.
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Lopez’s sister also testified that Lopez did not own the gun. However, the testimony
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affiliation—a status, rather than an act. The law does not purport to punish
a person for committing gang crimes or for acting in concert with a gang, but
rather punishes the mere association with gang members. 118
It is worth noting that there is a dissimilarity between the Robinson law
and Section 186.22(a). While an addict was subject to prosecution at any
time, Section 186.22(a) requires that a felonious crime be committed for
prosecution to occur. An argument could be made that the requirement of an
underlying crime serves as an actus reus and thus shields Section 186.22(a)
from the Robinson Court’s rationale. But as previously noted, Section
186.22(a) is a substantive offense and thus the underlying crime is
extraneous. 119 If the addiction law had required an unrelated underlying
felonious crime, the Robinson analysis would remain the same because the
status of drug addiction would still be criminalized. Therefore, the
requirement that an underlying felony be committed does not shield Section
186.22(a) from the Robinson rationale.
B. IF CLASSIFIED AS AN ENHANCEMENT OFFENCE, SECTION
186.22(A) SHOULD BE DEEMED UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Since Section 186.22(a) requires an underlying felony, it could be
argued that Section 186.22(a) is not in fact a substantive offense, but rather
an enhancement offense. The observation that Section 186.22(a) might not
be properly classified as a substantive offense would seem to be supported
by the fact that Section 186.22(a) is dependent on an underlying felonious
crime and, absent the felonious crime, Section 186.22(a) would be
inapplicable. The significance of this argument is that Robinson did not
examine punishing a status tied to an unrelated act. For example, consider
replacing the gang language of Section 186.22(a) with addiction to read: any
person who is addicted to narcotics with knowledge that narcotics are
criminal, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious
criminal conduct by narcotics addicts, shall be punished. 120 Such a statute
118

The Robinson Court likewise noted that the California addiction statute “is not one
which punishes a person for the use of narcotics, for their purchase, sale or possession, or for
antisocial or disorderly behavior resulting from their administration . . . . [r]ather, we deal with
a statute which makes the ‘status’ of narcotic addiction a criminal offense.” Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 666. (1962).
119
See supra Section I.B (discussing the difference between a substantive and an
enhancement offense).
120
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would seem to make Robinson inapplicable because liability would be based
on both a status and action, as opposed to just a status even though the action
might be unrelated to the status. But even when coupled with an action, an
offense unrelated to the status would still likely fail constitutional muster
based on the analysis in the proceeding paragraphs.
While the United States Supreme Court has never examined drug
addiction or gang enhancements tied to unrelated felonies, there are several
Supreme Court cases examining the application of hate crime enhancements
in such contexts. While the definition of what constitutes a hate crime may
vary by state, hate crime enhancements, in general, are “heightened penalties
when certain crimes, independently punishable under other penal code
sections, are committed because of the victim’s race, color, religion,
ethnicity, or other such characteristic.” 121 Hate crimes can appropriately be
analogized to narcotics use by an addict in the sense that the status of hating
another racial group does not trigger a sentence enhancement, but rather the
commission of the hateful acts towards that group triggers the sentence
enhancement. 122 The question of whether hate crime enhancements could
constitutionally be applied to non-hate crimes was discussed by the Supreme
Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell.
In Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court, affirming Mitchell’s
conviction of race-based aggravated battery, analyzed when enhancements
for hate crimes were appropriately assessed on an underlying crime by
contrasting two cases: Dawson v. Delaware and Barclay v. Florida. 123 In
Dawson, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. 124 During the
sentencing phase of the trial, the prosecution introduced evidence that
Dawson was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood, a violent white nationalist
gang, but the prosecutor failed to link Dawson’s crime to his membership in
the Aryan Brotherhood. 125 Vacating the judgment, the Supreme Court noted
that had the prosecutor linked Dawson’s membership in the Aryan
Brotherhood to his crimes, then his membership in the Aryan Brotherhood
would have been relevant to his sentencing. 126 Because Dawson’s
membership was unrelated to his crimes, the Court held that Dawson’s
county jail for a period not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison for 16
months, or two or three years.”).
121
Note, Hate Is Not Speech: A Constitutional Defense of Penalty Enhancement for Hate
Crimes, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1315 (1993).
122
See generally Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 486 (1993).
123
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124
Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 161 (1992).
125
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126
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sentence violated the First Amendment as “the evidence proved nothing more
than Dawson’s abstract beliefs.” 127
The Mitchell Court then compared the holding in Dawson with the
holding in Barclay v. Florida. 128 In Barclay, the defendant was a member of
the Black Liberation Army who, along with other members, killed a random
white man with the goal of starting a revolution and racial war. 129 In
affirming Barclay’s death sentence, the Supreme Court, in a plurality
opinion, held that Barclay’s racial hatred was relevant as an aggravating
factor because Barclay’s hatred led him to commit the murder.130 Despite
both Dawson and Barclay dealing with the sentencing phase as opposed to a
hate crime enhancement, the Mitchell Court concluded that the rationale in
both were relevant as “death, [is] surely the most severe ‘enhancement.’” 131
The Mitchell Court noted that the purpose of an enhancement is to punish
“conduct [that] is thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm.” 132
Thus, applying both cases, the Mitchell Court concluded that bias is relevant
only when an enhancement seeks to penalize bias-inspired conduct on the
grounds that different crimes—those motivated by bias as opposed to
unbiased crimes— 133 should have different severities of punishment. 134
The application of Section 186.22(a) as an enhancement offense where
the underlying crime is non-gang-related is akin to the testimony that Dawson
was a white supremacist and likewise, is irrelevant when not connected to the
underlying crime. If the goal of an enhancement penalty is to punish crimes
of different severity with different sentences, then it does not make sense to
punish crimes of the same magnitude differently. The application of Section
186.22(a) to non-gang-related crimes ultimately punishes the defendant for
his or her membership, which is akin to punishing the defendant for his or
127
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Wisconsin, 508 U.S. at 486.
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130
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133
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Overcome Bias, 16 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 229, 234 (2000). For example, graffitiing an X
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134
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her abstract beliefs. This is evidenced by the fact that just because a felonious
crime was committed by a gang member does not make it anymore heinous
than if the felonious crime was committed by a non-gang member, when gang
membership is irrelevant to the felonious crime. Therefore, even if Section
186.22(a) was deemed an enhancement offense, as opposed to its current
classification as a substantive offense, it would likely fail constitutional
muster per Dawson.
V. GANG AFFILIATION SHOULD BE TREATED THROUGH
REHABILITATION RATHER THAN THROUGH
CRIMINALIZATION AND IMPRISONMENT
The remainder of this Comment will argue that, as a matter of public
policy, gang membership should be treated similarly to the modern-day
treatment of drug addicts as opposed to punished by way of imprisonment.
The basis for this argument is the underlying policy reasons emphasized in
the Robinson Court’s second holding, that it would be a cruel and unusual
punishment to punish a person for having a disease. 135 Instead of focusing
solely on Section 186.22(a), this argument expands to include gang
enhancements in general, which would include Section 186.22(b).
Admittedly, considering the Court’s decision in Powell, the argument that
gang membership should be considered a disease is a difficult argument to
make. But as discussed in the following subsections, in many ways, gang
membership parallels drug addiction, perhaps even more closely than
alcoholism parallels drug addiction, and thus the Robinson rationale should
extend to gang membership.
A. WHY PUNISHING ADDICTION AMOUNTS TO A CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

Prior to comparing addiction to gang affiliation, it is paramount to
understand the policy reasons behind the Robinson Court’s decision that
punishing an addict is akin to punishing a person for having a disease. While
there is not a clear definition of what constitutes a disease, the Robinson
Court’s decision does classify drug addiction as a disease. According to
DiClemente’s Addiction and Change, the essential elements of an addiction
are:
(1) the development of a solidly established, problematic pattern of an appetitive—that
is, pleasurable and reinforcing—behavior; (2) the presence of physiological and
psychological components of the behavior pattern that create dependence; and (3) the

135
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interaction of these components in the individual’s life that make the behavior very
important and resistant to change. 136

In the case of drug addiction, these elements are oftentimes readably
observable. 137 Common environmental factors that contribute to the
development of an individual’s addiction to drugs include: “poverty, limited
material conditions, disorganized families . . . [and] group affiliation to drug
users.” 138 These environmental factors are then coupled with the early age
of drug users; the most common age being between eighteen and twentyfive. 139 The culmination of these factors leads to an appetite for drugs as a
means of escaping a less than desirable social condition. 140
While the environmental factors create the desire for drug use, the
physiological and psychological components of drug addiction create a
dependence on drugs. This dependence can be described as a necessity to
use drugs to maintain normal physiological symptoms. 141 For example, users
of methamphetamine (meth) experience a euphoric state of invulnerability
which users describe as “a vacation from loneliness and sorrow.” 142 In
addition to the psychological effects of meth, the physiological effects of
meth further cause dependence. Meth causes the brain to release large
quantities of dopamine which results in an intense pleasurable high. 143 Once
dopamine levels return to normal the only way for the user to regain their

136
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high is to take more meth, thus creating the physiological dependence. 144 The
culmination of these factors makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a drug
addict to stop using drugs absent treatment.
Applying the purposes of criminal law, it is this difficulty in quitting
that makes the imprisonment of addicts a form of cruel and unusual
punishment. 145 As the Robinson Court noted, “[e]ven one day in prison
would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common
cold.” 146 Punishing a drug addict for being a drug addict does not deter the
individual from using drugs in the future because punishment fails to address
the underlying cause of addiction—the addict’s physical and psychological
dependence on the drug. The ineffectiveness of imprisonment is evidenced
by the fact that an estimated 95% of convicted drug users return to substance
abuse once released from imprisonment.147
Therefore, instead of imprisonment, the modern-day focus is treating
drug addicts through rehabilitation programs. 148 While drug addicts are still
charged for committing crimes, their addiction is not considered a crime but
instead a treatable disease. As a result of this change in focus, rehabilitation
program participants have been found to be up to 67% less likely to
recidivate. 149 The next section will contrast the archetypical gang member
with the archetypical drug addict and argue that mandatory rehabilitation, as
opposed to incarceration, should be advocated rather than criminalization as
imposed by Section 186.22. 150
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B. THE POLICY RATIONALE FOR TREATING RATHER THAN
IMPRISONING DRUG ADDICTS ALSO APPLIES TO GANG
AFFILIATES

The archetypal gang affiliate parallels that of a drug addict. The average
gang member comes from a family with low socioeconomic status, living in
a neighborhood with high existing gang membership. 151 Often, the
archetypal gang affiliate has a family history of gang membership and
criminality that indoctrinates family members in the gang lifestyle from a
young age. 152 While it is unclear what the average age of a gang member is,
several studies have concluded that gang membership peaks around the ages
of fourteen and fifteen. 153
As previously discussed, addicts often use drugs to fulfill a need, such
as a means of escaping a less than desirable social condition. 154 Likewise,
gang affiliation provides a means for affiliates to seemingly escape their less
than ideal social conditions. In one respect, gang affiliation provides physical
support to affiliates. 155 Gangs are most prevalent in neighborhoods with the
highest rates of violence. 156 Gangs serve a protection function for affiliates.
Furthermore, those who live in these impoverished communities and
refuse to join a neighborhood gang risk physical retaliation by the gang
Community members in such
against them and their family. 157
neighborhoods often have a strong distrust towards law enforcement based
on historical mistreatment.158 Furthermore, gangs are known to enforce strict
“no-snitch rules” that punish and sometimes even kill community members
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who look for support outside of the gang. 159 Thus, like a drug addict, a gang
affiliate’s environment has a significant impact on the gang affiliate joining
and remaining in a gang.
Once a person becomes affiliated with a gang it is extremely difficult to
end that affiliation due to the possibility of physical harm and psychological
dependence. The risk of physical harm in leaving a gang mirrors the physical
addiction of drug users. Take for example the story of Keith Smith, a fifteenyear-old who was beaten into a coma for attempting to leave his gang. 160
This situation is not uncommon as gangs frequently enforce a “blood in,
blood out” policy whereby members who attempt to leave risk severe
beatings or even being killed. 161 Like an addict who takes drugs to achieve
a desired physical state, a gang affiliate must remain affiliated with a gang to
maintain his or her physical state.
Furthermore, the physical need for gang affiliation is accompanied by
an even greater psychological dependence. As previously discussed, people
affiliate with gangs to fulfill a need. This is often the need to cope with a less
than ideal socioeconomic condition. 162 Gangs use this fulfillment to bond
with their community and provide their members with protection and a means
of identity. In some cases, gang membership has existed in communities for
generations. 163 For gang affiliates to cease being affiliated with their gang
would thus require them to separate from their community and perhaps even
their family. This requirement is shown in several studies, which concluded
that ex-gang members who remain in contact with gang members, such as by
living in the same community, experience higher rates of victimization by
the gang. 164 In conjunction with the economic infeasibility of leaving their
community, gang affiliates might reasonably believe their only option is to
remain affiliated with their gang.
Thus, in many ways, the reasons for why a person joins and remains in
a gang parallels why a drug addict remains addicted to drugs. The
development of both drug addiction and gang affiliation stems from a
problematic underlying condition and is difficult to change due to
159
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physiological and psychological dependencies. The Robinson Court noted
that the criminalization of drug addiction did not attempt to cure the
underlying problem but merely served to punish. 165 Likewise, California’s
punishment of gang members through imprisonment does not cure
California’s gang problem but has rather exasperated it. When Section
186.22(a) was enacted, the number of gangs in California was estimated to
be nearly 600. 166 That number has increased to over 6,442 since the
enactment of Section 186.22(a)—an increase of roughly 973%. 167 While
California is undoubtedly sending more gang members to prison, prisons
have been described as a “breeding ground” for gang membership, and in
some areas, the number of gang members in prison has climbed by over 32%
in the last decade alone. 168 Numerous studies have concluded that prison is
ineffective at treating the gang problem. In one study, gang affiliates were
shown to be six percentage points more likely to return to prison than
prisoners without gang affiliation. 169 In another study, 83.2% of gang
members returned to prison within three years compared to only 44.8% of
non-gang members. 170 These statistics highlight that the criminalization
process, specifically imprisonment, is ineffective at preventing and deterring
gang membership.
Instead of criminalization, California should spend its resources on the
intervention and rehabilitation of gang members. Programs aimed at
rehabilitating gang members and preventing gang membership in the first
place like the California Gang Reduction, Intervention and Prevention
(CalGRIP) program, have shown to drastically decrease gang member
recidivism. 171 Likewise, the switch from criminalizing drug addicts to
treating them has drastically reduced their recidivism rate. 172 Thus, treating
165
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gang members would likely result in a drastic decrease in their recidivism
rate considering how the underlying factors of gang affiliation mirror the
underlying factors of drug addiction. In addition to reducing recidivism,
studies have shown the cost of gang rehabilitation programs is significantly
lower than the cost of incarcerating gang affiliates. 173
CONCLUSION
The purposes of criminal law are to deter, punish, and rehabilitate. 174
Section 186.22(a) accomplishes none of these objectives. A gang affiliate is
not deterred from gang affiliation by a system that does nothing to cure the
underlying causes of gang affiliation because gang affiliation, like a disease,
cannot be cured by a prison sentence. While proponents of the STEP Act
cite the difficulty of convicting gang affiliates for their crimes as a
justification for Section 186.22(a), such an argument does not validate a law
which punishes mere gang affiliation. 175 Furthermore, when gang affiliates
commit crimes, they are still subject to the sentences that their crimes carry.
Incarcerating a gang member in hopes of deterring the gang member from
remaining in the gang is akin to exposing someone with a disease to other
people who have that disease and hoping that the increased exposure will
cure the disease. Until the cause of gang affiliation is properly treated, more
people will continue to receive additional sentences for a crime akin to
having a cold.
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